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This paper examines the determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates before 
and after the beginning of the financial crisis in Greece. Analyzing firm-level data for the 
period between 2000 - 2014, we find strong evidence that specific firm characteristics 
including firm size, financial leverage, capital and inventory intensity influence the level of 
corporate effective tax rates. Our results also indicate that corporate effective tax rates and 
their association with the firm-specific characteristics were significantly influenced in the 
sub-period after the beginning of the financial crisis. Our findings may have important 
implications both for policy makers and firms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Assessing the impact of the tax system on business activity is of primary importance 
to economists, tax advisors, firms and policy makers. One of the most important elements of 
the tax system is undoubtedly the statutory income tax rate. Statutory income tax rates may 
act as an incentive or an obstacle to business investment, and this is the most obvious reason 
they have been so widely studied. 
Statutory income tax rates (STR), though, do not take into account the tax base of 
income tax. Effective Tax Rates (ETRs), on the other hand, demonstrate more accurately the 
direct monetary costs of taxation, as they incorporate in one single measure the STR as well 
as the tax base on which it is applied. Their study and the way they are determined for 
different firms across the same jurisdiction may provide important implications for policy 
makers and firms. 
This paper uses panel data to examine the determinants of corporate ETRs before and 
after the beginning of the financial crisis in Greece. It investigates the ETRs from a micro 
backward-looking perspective, using elements of firms’ financial statements to derive 
effective corporate taxation. It contributes to the existing empirical research in various ways. 
Firstly, this is, to our knowledge, the only empirical study that has ever analyzed ETRs and 
their determinants in Greece using firm-level data. The dataset used includes a large number 
of firms (a final sample of 4,936 firms) for an extended period (2000 - 2014), creating one of 
the largest samples ever studied in this field (74,040 observations) and thus substantially 
increasing the validity of our results. Furthermore, emphasis is placed on the way that the 
financial crisis period affected firms’ ETRs and their determinants; an issue that, to the best of 
our knowledge, has not been empirically investigated in the past. Finally, econometric 
specification problems that usually exist in the literature are addressed by controlling for both 
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time - invariant variables and endogeneity (due to the bi-directional causality between ETRs 
and their determinants). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the prior 
research on the major determinants of ETRs. In Section III, we develop the hypotheses tested 
in our study based on the Greek tax legislation. In Section IV, we analyze the sample 
selection method, describe the variables and present the specification model and the 
estimation strategy. In Section V, we report and discuss the results. Finally, Section VI 
concludes by summarizing the results, presenting policy implications as well as potential 
limitations of the study that could be used as ideas for further research. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW: ETRs DETERMINANTS 
Prior research has focused on ETR variance across different firms operating in the 
same jurisdiction as well as on the neutrality of income tax with regards to specific firm’s 
characteristics such as size, financial leverage, capital and inventory intensity. The 
relationships that have been examined in the literature are reviewed below.  
A. ETR and Firm’s Size 
The prevailing theories of the relationship between ETR and firm’s size are two: the 
political cost theory and the political power theory. Under the political cost theory, large 
firms are expected to be taxed at a higher ETR as they are more easily targeted by the 
government, tax authorities and public opinion (Zimmerman, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). As a result, law changes could be designed exclusively to re-distribute wealth from 
these firms to priority groups. A higher ETR can also occur for large firms as the goal of 
reducing their tax liability may be downplayed in favor of the impression of financial 
soundness that should be given to the firm’s stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, creditors). 
Moreover, smaller firms usually receive favorable tax treatment for the benefit of 
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entrepreneurship and employment resulting in lower ETRs in comparison with larger firms 
(Buijink, Janssen and Schols, 1999). On the other hand, under the political power theory, 
large firms are expected to be taxed at a lower ETR as they have the resources to influence 
the legislative procedure to their benefit either directly or through their professional unions 
(Siegfried, 1972). Furthermore, large firms are better able to specialize in tax planning 
activities that can reduce their tax burden. 
Researchers have repeatedly examined the relationship between firm’s size and ETR. 
The results were conflicting, though, as there are supporting evidence for both the political 
cost theory (e.g., Zimmerman, 1983; Wilkie and Limberg, 1990; Kern and Morris, 1992) and 
the political power theory (e.g., Siegfried, 1972; Porcano, 1986). Nicodeme (2007), trying to 
interpret these conflicting results, argues that these studies were carried out in a univariate 
context with size as the sole explanatory variable which might have led to biased coefficients. 
On the contrary, recent studies were conducted in a multivariate context but, nonetheless, the 
degree of conflict in the results was not significantly reduced. There are recent researches that 
empirically confirmed the political power theory (e.g., Richardson and Lanis, 2007), others 
that confirmed the political cost theory (e.g., Vandenbussche and Tan, 2005), and still others 
with mixed results (e.g., Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Janssen and Buijink, 2000; Nicodeme, 
2002; Vandenbussche, Crabbe and Janssen, 2005). 
B. ETR and Firm’s Financial Leverage 
Firm’s financial leverage is another factor that may affect its ETR. More specifically, 
a firm has three ways to finance its activities: equity financing (that is, raising money by 
issuing shares), debt financing (that is, raising money through loans) and, more often, a 
combination of these two types of financing. In each financing method, a fee must be paid 
back to the financiers either as a dividend (in the case of equity financing) or as interest (in 
the case of debt financing). Focusing on the way interest and dividends are treated in tax 
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legislation, a negative association between ETR and firm’s leverage is expected as interest is 
usually deductible from taxable income whereas the distributed dividends are not. This 
distinction creates an apparently more favorable tax regime for firms that prefer debt 
financing leading to the reasonable assumption that firms with higher financial leverage face 
lower ETRs than firms that prefer equity financing. It is noteworthy that variations of this 
general rule may exist in tax systems across the world, such as, for example, in Belgium, 
where, as Crabbe (2010) notes, a certain percentage of equity may be deducted from the 
taxable income. 
The effect of financial leverage on ETR has been empirically examined in the 
literature. The majority of studies confirm the expected negative relationship between these 
two variables, as firms with higher financial leverage exhibit lower effective tax rates 
(Stickney and McGee, 1982; Buijink, Janssen and Schols, 1999; Vandenbussche, Crabbe, 
Janssen, 2005; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Crabbe, 2010). However, some studies 
demonstrate that there is a positive and significant relationship between ETR and financial 
leverage (Harris and Feeny, 2003; Janssen, 2005). Finally, it is worth noting that Gupta and 
Newberry (1997) conclude that the sign of this relationship is sensitive to the income measure 
used in the denominator of the ETR. 
C. ETR and Firm’s Capital Intensity 
A firm’s investment in fixed assets may also have an impact on its ETR. Fixed assets 
are assets “that are held for use in the production or supply of goods or services, for rental to 
others, or for administrative purposes and are expected to be used during more than one 
period” (IASB, 2016a). Firms can systematically allocate the depreciable amount of an asset 
over its useful life, that is, they can allocate the cost of the asset less its residual value over 
the period over which it is expected to be used by the firm. This allows firms to offset part of 
the cost undertaken against future profits, especially given the fact that losses can be carried 
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forward up to a specific amount of years. It is, therefore, expected, that, ceteris paribus, a firm 
which invests in increasing its fixed assets will exhibit lower effective tax rates. This 
hypothesis is further strengthened by the possible existence of tax incentives for firms that 
invest in fixed assets. 
Empirical research typically confirms this negative relationship. Stickney and McGee 
(1982), Gupta and Newberry (1997), Vandenbussche, Crabbe and Janssen, (2005), Janssen 
(2005), Richardson and Lanis (2007) and Crabbe (2010) concluded, among others, that firms 
with higher fixed-assets ratios face lower ETRs.  
D. ETR and Firm’s Inventory Intensity 
Inventories are “assets held for sale in the ordinary course of business, or in the 
process of production for such sale, or in the form of materials or supplies to be consumed in 
the production process or in the rendering of services” (IASB, 2016b). Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) were among the first to include an inventory ratio in their ETR study. They argue that 
to the extent that the inventory ratio is a substitute for the fixed - assets ratio, inventory-
intensive firms should face relatively higher ETRs, as long as these firms use the same 
inventory method for both book and tax purposes. This hypothesis has been confirmed 
empirically by subsequent studies (e.g., Richardson and Lanis, 2007). However, there do 
exist other studies that didn’t result in a statistically significant relationship between 
inventory intensity and ETR (e.g., Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Adhikari, Derashid and Zhang, 
2006).  
E. ETR and Firm’s Sector 
The sector in which a firm operates is another factor that may lead to varying ETRs. 
Although direct tax measures for specific sectors are generally difficult to be implemented, 
especially in the European Union context, as the aid granted by the Member States should not 
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distort competition, such measures may be applied under certain conditions to promote 
economic or social goals (e.g., increasing exports). As Nicodeme (2002) states, these 
measures may be of technical nature (e.g., depreciation rules), may be implemented as policy 
objectives (e.g., tax exemptions for R&D expenditures) or may be the result of specific 
discretionary administrative practices towards specific sectors. Moreover, there may exist 
provisions that are not targeted at specific sectors but have, nonetheless, similar effects. For 
example, the introduction of a tax credit for firms investing in new technologies may benefit 
the new sectors of the economy. In conclusion, different sectors may receive different tax 
treatment and, consequently, these differences may lead to different ETRs. Sector’s impact on 
ETRs has been empirically confirmed in various studies (e.g., Stickney and McGee, 1982; 
Buijink, Janssen and Schols, 1999; Nicodeme, 2002; Derashid and Zhang, 2003; 
Vandenbussche, Crabbe and Janssen, 2005; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Crabbe, 2010). 
F. ETR and Firm’s Location 
Although ETRs may also vary in relation to the geographical area that the firms 
operate in, this relationship has not been widely examined in the literature. Vandenbussche, 
Crabbe and Janssen (2005) were among the few who examined the firm’s location as a 
determinant of the ETR. Specifically, they showed that a part of the variation of the Belgians 
firms’ ETR can be attributed to the region that the firms operate in. 
G. ETR and Firm’s Legal Form 
The firm’s legal form may also differentiate its ETR as a result of different STRs 
and/or differences in the tax base on which the STR is applied. This relationship is usually not 
examined in depth probably because research cannot be extended to all types of legal entities 
but only to those obliged to publish their financial statements. 
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H. ETR and Firm’s Profitability 
A firm’s ETR is a function of its tax to pretax income and, therefore, it may change 
simply due to changes in pretax income. To control for these changes, relevant studies add a 
profitability measure as a control variable. Given that holding a firm’s tax preferences and 
total assets constant while increasing its profitability will increase its ETR (Wilkie, 1988), a 
positive relationship between profitability and ETRs can be expected (Gupta and Newberry, 
1997; Harris and Feeny, 2003; Richardson and Lanis, 2007). 
I. ETR and Events During the Reference Period 
Specific events during the reference period may also cause variation in the firms’ 
ETRs and their determinants. Such events may be, for example, a tax reform, a government 
change, or the outbreak of a financial crisis. Past studies focused on possible variations in 
firms’ ETRs and their association with firms’ specific characteristics in the periods following 
a tax reform.
 1
 On the other hand, there are no studies, at least to the extent of our knowledge, 
that focus on other events that may alter a firm’s ETR such as the beginning of a financial 
crisis or a government change. 
J. ETR and Other Variables 
A firm’s ETR could also be influenced by several other factors. For instance, the 
extent of the firm’s foreign operations may differentiate its ETR. This was originally 
suggested by Stickney and McGee (1982) and was further examined by Gupta and Newberry 
(1997), Buijink, Janssen and Schols (1999), Harris and Feeny (2003), Janssen (2005) and 
others. Additionally, the firm’s extent of involvement in research and development has been 
identified as another factor that may affect the firm’s ETR as R&D expenditures are usually 
                                                                                                                   
 
1
 For example, Gupta and Newberry (1997) studied the impact of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 and 
Richardson and Lanis (2007) the impact of the Australian Ralph Review of Business Taxation Reform. 
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associated with preferential tax treatment (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Buijink, Janssen and 
Schols, 1999; Harris and Feeny, 2003; Richardson and Lanis, 2007). The effect of the auditor 
and tax advice expenses has also been studied in the past. Crabbe (2010), using Belgian firm-
level data, concluded that spending money on tax advice does not reduce the firm’s ETR, 
while hiring a big four auditor (Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst & Young and PWC) does. 
Furthermore, it has been noted that firms that are listed on the stock market (public 
companies) have more incentives to report higher book income relatively to taxable income, 
altering in that way their ETRs (Mills and Newberry, 2001; Cloyd, Pratt and Stock, 1996; 
Janssen, 2005; Crabbe, 2010). Finally, as Gupta and Newberry (1997) note, there are also 
some other factors that may have an impact on ETRs such as the firm’s ownership structure, 
its compensation policies, its corporate culture as well as possible corporate reorganizations 
through mergers and acquisitions. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Based on the previous literature review, we proceed to the formulation of the 
following testable hypotheses taking into account the specific characteristics of the Greek tax 
system. 
Regarding firm’s size association with ETRs, it can be stated that, although there are 
no direct law provisions in the Greek Income Tax Code (Income Tax Code, 2013; Income 
Tax Code, 1994) that may cause variation in the ETRs of firms of different size, there are 
several other reasons why such a variation can be expected. In particular, ETR differences 
may occur due to other laws’ provisions as, for example, the bookkeeping obligations that 
differ depending on firm’s size (Greek Accounting Standards, 2014; Code of Tax Reporting 
of Transactions, 2012; Code for Books and Records, 1992). Similarly, the investment laws 
(e.g., Investment Law, 2011) provide that the aid percentage varies by firm’s size. Moreover, 
the ETRs can be expected to be associated with firm’s size considering the way tax legislation 
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is implemented in Greece. For example, we can refer to the existence of specific tax audit 
authorities that focus exclusively on large firms (e.g., the Audit Authority for Large 
Enterprises). All the above, if added to the general discussion that was presented in the 
previous section, can lead us to the hypothesis that there does exist a relationship between 
firms’ ETR and their size in Greece. Taking furthermore into account that tax legislation 
seems to create a less demanding environment for small and medium-sized firms (allowing 
them, for example, to keep their accounting books in less detail), we can expect a positive 
relationship between ETR and firm’s size.  
H1: Firm’s ETR is positively related to its size 
The Greek Income Tax Code allows the deduction of interest from taxable income 
which leads, as a result, to lower taxable income and lower tax. On the contrary, dividends 
are not tax deductible. The above combination creates, as a matter of fact, a more favorable 
tax environment for firms with higher financial leverage and therefore, a negative 
relationship between ETR and financial leverage is expected.  
H2: Firm’s ETR is negatively related to its financial leverage 
The Greek Income Tax Code allows firms to depreciate yearly their fixed assets 
allocating their cost over their useful life, giving firms the chance to offset part of the cost 
undertaken against future profits. Since fixed assets’ useful life may extend up to 20 years 
and at the same time losses can be carried forward up to 5 years, there may exist a 
preferential treatment for firms that invest more in fixed assets in comparison, for example, 
with firms that have to recognize the total amount of their expenses immediately. Moreover, 
firms in Greece enjoy specific tax exemptions provided by investment laws when investing in 
property, plant and equipment. Based on the above law provisions, we can expect a negative 
relationship between firms’ ETR and their capital intensity. 
H3: Firm’s ETR is negatively related to its capital intensity  
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Before stating the hypothesis for ETR’s association with firm’s investment in its 
inventory, we should note that, under the Greek Income Tax Code, firms are obliged to use 
the same inventory method for both book and tax purposes, creating a tax - neutral 
environment with no signs of differential tax treatment for inventory intensive firms. Given, 
though, Gupta’s and Newberry’s (1997) hypothesis that inventory-intensive firms should face 
relatively higher ETRs to the extent that the inventory ratio is a substitute for the fixed - 
assets ratio, we can expect that the firm’s ETR will be positively related to its inventory 
intensity. 
H4: Firm’s ETR is positively related to its inventory intensity  
The Greek Income Tax Code does not include any direct provisions that provide 
indications of preferential tax treatment of different sectors. There are provisions though that 
may indirectly alter the tax base depending on the firm’s sector, such as the depreciation rates 
which may benefit firms of specific sectors (e.g., constructions) at the expense of others. 
Moreover, the investment laws may apply to investment plans in specific branches of 
economic activity or may exclude specific sectors (e.g., Investment Law of 2011 excludes the 
steel sector, the coal sector etc.). Last but not least, it should be noted that the tax framework 
in Greece is completely different for ship owning firms as Greek-flagged ships are taxed 
according to their gross tonnage and their construction year, regardless of their business 
income (Greek tonnage tax regime, 1975). All the facts mentioned above can lead us to the 
hypothesis that firms operating in different sectors in Greece may indeed face different ETRs. 
H5: Firm’s ETR is related to the sector in which the firm operates 
The tax law and its implementation in Greece may offer signs of preferential tax 
treatment depending on the location in which a firm operates. For example, the extent of the 
aid provided by investment laws in the form of tax reliefs is different for firms operating in 
different geographical areas of Greece. Moreover, there exists a provision in the Greek 
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Income Tax Code for a reduced statutory tax rate for firms that operate in islands with 
population less than 3,100 residents. Furthermore, it can be assumed that tax controls and 
audits are implemented differently in the various geographical areas of the country. This 
hypothesis is based on the varying efficiency of the regional tax offices, as expressed by the 
number of tax audits and the revenues generated (General Secretariat for Public Revenue, 
2015). In conclusion, it can be expected that ETRs in Greece are related to the geographical 
area in which the firm operates. 
H6: Firm’s ETR is related to the location in which the firm operates 
The tax framework in Greece provides also indications that the ETRs vary in relation 
to the firm’s legal form. Firms operating as limited companies and partnerships face typically 
different statutory tax rates under the Greek Income Tax Code. More importantly, different 
statutory tax rates have been imposed in the past even between public limited liability 
companies (AE) and limited liability companies (EPE) (Income Tax Code, 1994) leading to 
the hypothesis that the legal form under which the firm operates may differentiate its ETR. It 
must be noted, though, that research is necessarily limited to public limited liability 
companies and limited liability companies as only these firms are obliged to publish their 
financial statements (balance sheet, profit and loss account etc.).   
H7: Firm’s ETR is related to its legal form 
Competitiveness of the goods and services on the international market and especially 
the company’s export performance is one of the criteria that an investment plan should satisfy 
to receive tax reliefs and credits under investments laws in Greece (e.g., Investment Law of 
2011). Given the favorable tax treatment towards export-oriented firms, it can be expected 
that a firm’s ETR is related to whether the firm engages in exporting activities or not.  
H8: Firm’s ETR is related to whether the firm exports or not 
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Considering that the conditions in the Greek market have deteriorated in the period 
after the beginning of the financial crisis, it is reasonable to expect that firms may have tried 
to adapt to the current financial situation by engaging more in tax planning activities. A 
decrease in the mean ETR can be therefore expected in the sub-period after the beginning of 
the financial crisis. Furthermore, it is also possible that the financial crisis period influenced 
ETRs’ association with firm’s specific characteristics (such as its size, capital intensity, 
inventory intensity and financial leverage). In more detail, it can be expected that larger firms 
may be more capable to adjust their strategy to the new circumstances, achieving, as a result, 
lower ETRs. The same holds true for inventory-intensive firms that are usually more flexible 
in comparison with capital – intensive firms that invest in the long-run and cannot easily 
adapt to the changing environment. Finally, firms with higher degree of financial leverage are 
expected to be influenced more by the liquidity problems after the beginning of the financial 
crisis, a fact that may alter, as a result, their taxable income and their ETRs. In conclusion, it 
can be expected that ETR’s association with firm’s specific characteristics is affected by the 
financial crisis period in Greece. It should be generally highlighted, though, that we examine 
the impact of the crisis period on corporate ETRs without isolating factors such as the impact 
of the global financial crisis or of changes in the political landscape in Greece. 
H9: Firm’s ETR and its association with firm’s specific characteristics are affected by 
the financial crisis period in Greece 
IV. SAMPLE, DATA AND VARIABLES 
A. Sample and Identification Strategy 
Our sample was collected from the ICAP Databank, the largest company database in 
Southeast Europe. It consisted initially of 53,235 firms operating in Greece over the period 
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2000 - 2014. The initial sample was then reduced by excluding firms falling into the 
following categories: 
Firms with missing data and/or no continuous activity in the reference period 
The initial sample included firms with missing data for certain years. It also included 
firms that started or ceased their activity during the period under consideration (2000 - 2014). 
These firms were removed from the dataset resulting in a sample with firms that have data for 
the entire 15-year period. 
Financial Firms and Insurance Companies 
Firms operating in the financial and insurance sector are excluded from the final 
sample as they are subject to different regulation, a fact that may lead to misinterpretations 
and conflicting results (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Buijink, 
Janssen and Schols, 1999; Richardson and Lanis, 2007). 
Firms with ETRs negative, “false” positive or greater than 1  
Based on the existing literature, we also excluded from the final sample: 
1. Firms with negative ETRs, that is firms with negative tax (tax refunds) or 
negative income (loss) (Holland, 1998; Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Derashid 
and Zhang, 2003; Vandenbussche, Crabbe and Janssen, 2005; Richardson and 
Lanis, 2007). The exclusion of these firms was considered necessary as ETR is a 
ratio that can be negative either due to the numerator or the denominator, a fact 
that may lead to misinterpretation problems. 
2. Firms with “false” positive ETRs, that is simultaneously negative tax (tax refund) 
and negative income (loss). Similarly, these firms were excluded from the final 
sample as “false” positive ETRs may also cause misinterpretation problems. 
3. Firms with ETRs greater than 1, since these observations can cause model 
estimation problems (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
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Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Richardson and 
Lanis, 2007) 
The final sample, after the exclusion of the firms mentioned above, consists of 4,936 
firms and 74,040 observations for the period 2000 - 2014. Table 1 summarizes the way the 
final sample was created. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
B. Variables 
1. Dependent variable 
The ETRs, from a micro backward-looking perspective, are typically calculated as the 
ratio of a measure of income tax to an income measure. There are significant discrepancies, 
though, among researchers regarding the appropriate definition of both the numerator and the 
denominator of ETRs.  
Considering the numerator, researchers are wavering whether a measure of current tax 
or a measure of income tax expense should be used. Current tax is “the amount of income 
taxes payable (or recoverable) in respect of the taxable profit (or tax loss) for a period” 
(IASB, 2016c). Income tax expense, on the other hand, is “the aggregate amount included in 
the determination of profit or loss for the period in respect of current and deferred tax” 
(IASB, 2016c). When firms do not recognize deferred taxation, the income tax expense may 
be identical to the current tax. Another decision that has to be made is whether the domestic 
income tax or the worldwide income tax should be included in the numerator. Researchers 
frequently use the worldwide income tax in the numerator and its related income measure in 
the denominator, even though, as Holland (1998) noted, the resulting ETRs may be sensitive 
to variations in the distribution of income across different jurisdictions. Finally, it is worth 
pointing out that other tax liabilities, besides income tax (e.g., VAT), are usually ignored as 
they are not entirely dependent on income levels (Holland, 1998). 
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As regards the denominator, numerous income measures can be used depending on 
the goals of the researcher and data availability. The alternatives that have been suggested in 
the literature include taxable income, operating cash flows, turnover, gross operating profit, 
EBITDA, operating result and net income before taxes. Taxable income is not preferred by 
researchers as its use will usually result in an ETR which is identical to the STR (Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997). Ratios formed with the use of turnover in the denominator lead to very 
small figures that hinder data analysis. Moreover, this measure may be misleading as 
information on major firm’s costs is not taken into account. A small ETR with the turnover in 
the denominator does not necessarily mean that the firm is facing low taxation as a large 
turnover might be necessary to cover firm’s costs (Nicodeme, 2001). The use of gross 
operating profit, operating result and EBITDA in the denominator is criticized on the same 
basis as these measures ignore important parts of the firm’s expenses (e.g., depreciation, 
interest). These measures, though, are useful when comparing different countries, as their 
definition do not differ very much between countries (Nicodeme, 2001). Furthermore, these 
measures reduce some of the problems that occur due to differences in accounting methods. 
Net (Book) income before taxes is another frequently used measure in the denominator of the 
ETR. This measure incorporates the impact of all tax incentives on ETRs. Finally, the use of 
operating cash flows has the advantage of excluding the impact of accrual accounting 
procedures that vary with firm size (Zimmerman, 1983). 
Given the available options for the definition of the ETR, it is considered necessary to 
use different proxies so as to improve the robustness of our results. In our study, three ETR 
measures are used to account for most of the factors discussed above. The three measures 
share the same numerator which is the current worldwide income tax. Deferred taxation was 
not taken into account as its recognition was not allowed in Greece until 31.12.2014 (with the 
exception of a small number of firms that prepare their financial statements in accordance 
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with IFRS). On the contrary, three different income measures have been used in the 
denominator of the ETR measures. More specifically, the first measure (ETR1) is defined as 
the ratio of tax payable to net income before taxes; the second measure (ETR2) is defined as 
the ratio of tax payable to operating result, and the third measure (ETR3) is defined as the 
ratio of tax payable to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA).  
2. Independent and control variables 
Firm-specific variables are included in our study by proxies for firm size, financial 
leverage, capital intensity, inventory intensity and profitability. Specifically, firm size (SIZE) 
is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is 
measured as the ratio of medium/long - term liabilities to total assets. Capital Intensity 
(CAPINT) is measured as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets. Inventory Intensity 
(INVINT) is measured as the ratio of end-year’s inventory to total assets. Return on Assets 
(ROA), which is included to control for profitability, is measured as the ratio of net income 
before taxes to total assets. Additionally, dummy variables for sectors (SECTOR), location 
(REGION), legal forms (LEGALFORM) and exporting firms (EXPORTS) are included in the 
specification to account for time-invariant characteristics that may cause variation in firms’ 
ETR. Finally, to assess the crisis period’s impact on corporate ETRs, a period dummy 
variable (CRISIS) is included in our model. This variable will distinguish the observations 
that refer to the periods before and after the beginning of the financial crisis in Greece. The 
CRISIS variable is coded 1, if the observation is for the sub-period after the beginning of the 
financial crisis, that is 2008 to 2014 or 0 otherwise, that is 2000 - 2007. We define year 2008 
as the year when the Greek economy showed the first signs of recession as Greece’s GDP 
started to decrease after an extended period of high growth rates, by 0.2% (Bank of Greece, 
2014). In the following years (2009 – 2014) GDP declined cumulatively by more than 25%. 
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In the same period, the unemployment rate shot up from 7.6% in 2008 to 26.1% in 2014. The 
cumulative decline in total and dependent employment exceeded 18% (18.40% and 18.34%, 
respectively).
2
 Moreover, on the basis of previous literature, four interaction terms have also 
been formed. These interaction terms were calculated by multiplying the CRISIS dummy 
variable by each of the main independent variables (SIZE, LEVERAGE, CAPINT, INVINT).
 3
 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, number of observations) for the three selected ETRs and the main 
explanatory variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
We notice that the ETR1 has a mean of 15.2% and a median of 9.60%. ETR2 has a 
mean of 14.4% and a median of 6.7% while ETR3 has a mean of 8.8% and a median of 0.9%. 
Considering that the three ETR measures have the same numerator (current tax) and the 
denominators are respectively the net income before taxes (ETR1), the operating result (ETR2) 
and the EBITDA (ETR3), it is reasonable that on average ETR1 is greater than ETR2 and ETR2 
is greater than ETR3. These statistics indicate, in other words, that the sample’s firms pay on 
average 15.2% of their net income before taxes, 14.4% of their operating result and 8.8% of 
their EBITDA as income tax. 
Concerning the independent variables, SIZE has a mean of 14.28 and a median of 
14.22, LEVERAGE has a mean of 0.066 and a median of 0, CAPINT has a mean of 0.41 and a 
median of 0.347, INVINT has a mean of 0.131 and median of 0.427, and finally, ROA has a 
mean of 0.025 and a median of 0.009. 
                                                                                                                   
 
2
 Statistics derived from the Hellenic Statistical Authority (http://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/eco) 
3
 For an overview of the variables, see Tables A1 – A3 in the Appendix. 
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Moving on to the analysis of the categorical variables, we can also make some 
particularly interesting observations. For example, ETR1 ranges on average from 4.6% in 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation sector to 22.4% in Human Health and Social Work 
Activities sector. Similarly, ETR1 appears to be lower on average in the Greek Islands (6.9% 
in the Ionian Islands, 7.8% in Crete and 9.5% in the Aegean Islands) and higher in Sterea 
Ellada, the area which includes, Athens, the capital city of Greece (18.6%). We also notice 
that the limited liability companies (EPE) face on average about 5% higher ETR1 than the 
public limited liability companies (AE) (19.9% to 14.9%). Similar results are obtained when 
examining the other two ETR measures (detailed tables are available upon request). 
Another interesting point to consider is that the mean ETR1 decreases from 18.1% in 
the pre-crisis period (2000 - 2007) to 12.9% in the period after the beginning of the financial 
crisis (2008 – 2014). Building on this observation, we notice that the dependent variables 
(ETR1, ETR2, ETR3) differ between the two periods (2000 – 2007 and 2008 – 2014) 
significantly at the 1% level (see two-sample tests in Table 2 above).    
Considering the correlations among the variables (Table 3), it is worth emphasizing 
that there is a positive correlation between SIZE and ETRs as well as between INVINT and 
ETRs. On the other hand, there is a negative correlation between CAPINT and ETRs and 
LEVERAGE and ETRs. A conclusion that can be reached is that CAPINT and INVΙΝΤ which 
are negatively correlated may act as substitutes in our sample, a finding that may be useful 
for explaining ETR’s and inventory intensity’s relationship. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
V. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
A. The Empirical Specification 
The test of our hypotheses will be based on the following empirical specifications: 
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where the dependent variable, ETRzit, is the corporate effective tax rate proxy. The 
independent variables include proxies for firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEVERAGE), 
capital intensity (CAPINT), inventory intensity (INVINT), profitability (ROA), sector 
(SECTOR), location (REGION), legal form (LEGALFORM), exports (EXPORTS), crisis 
(CRISIS) and interaction terms (CRISIS*SIZE, CRISIS*LEVERAGE, CRISIS*CAPINT, 
CRISIS*INVINT). The unobserved specific error is denoted by i  and it  is the usual error 
term (observation specific error). The subscripts denote the three alternative proxies that are 
used for effective tax rates (z), the sector (j), the location (k), the time dimension (t), and the 
firm (i). Finally, q and l denote the number of sectors and the number of regions, respectively. 
Given the fact that our specification contains four time-invariant variables (SECTOR, 
REGION, LEGALFORM, EXPORTS) the most appropriate estimation method is the one 
proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). A fixed-effects model is not suitable for this case 
as all time-invariant characteristics will be eliminated and absorbed by the fixed-effects in the 
specification. On the other hand, a random-effects model allows the inclusion of time-
invariant variables in the specification. It is based, though, on the hypothesis that the 
independent variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved time-invariant random variable, 
which is not true in our case; according to the literature, a bi-directional causality between 
ETR and some of the independent variables most probably exists. At first, analyzing the 
relationship between ETR and LEVERAGE and, given that interest expenses are tax 
deductible, it is possible that firms with high marginal tax rates are more likely to use debt 
)1(
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financing, reversing in that way the cause – effect examined relationship. In the same context, 
it has been noted that low ETRs may cause lower levels of some of the firm-level investment 
variables (Vandenbussche, Crabbe and Janssen, 2005). Moreover, it has been empirically 
proved that the ETRs affect the size distribution of firms (Heshmati, Johansson, Bjuggren, 
2010). Moreover, we believe that total assets as a proxy for firm’s size are most probably 
correlated with the unobserved time-invariant random variable. For example, unobserved 
variables such as the firm’s corporate culture that cannot be included in our model due to data 
constraints may be correlated with the firm’s size leading to a potential endogeneity problem. 
For all the reasons mentioned above, SIZE, LEVERAGE, CAPINT, INVINT and ROA should 
be all treated as endogenous variables. The same holds for the interaction terms created using 
these variables.  
Taking into account all the facts mentioned above, we decided to use a Hausman-
Taylor random effects model which allows the inclusion of time-invariant variables 
accommodating simultaneously the potential endogeneity problems that may occur.  
B. Results and Discussion 
Table 4 summarizes the Hausman-Taylor random effects model results. The results 
are based on a sample of 4,936 firms operating in Greece for the period of 2000 to 2014 
(74,040 observations). The test of our hypotheses is based on equations (1) and (2).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
All of the regression models in Table 4 are statistically significant at less than the 0.01 
level as the Wald tests reported reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero. 
As regards the ETR determinants, we find that the corporate ETRs in Greece vary with 
specific firm characteristics such as its size, financial leverage, its capital and inventory 
intensity. More specifically, the results indicate that larger firms face higher ETRs than 
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smaller firms. This positive association between ETR and SIZE, which is significant at the 1% 
level (p < 0.01), is consistent with the hypothesis H1 and the political cost theory, implying 
that larger firms in Greece are not capable of exploiting their power to reduce their tax 
burden, at least not to a considerable degree. As a result, they end up being taxed at a higher 
ETR than smaller firms. In contrast, financial leverage (LEVERAGE) has a negative 
association with ETR, as expected, confirming H2 hypothesis. This suggests that firms that 
prefer debt to equity financing face lower effective tax rates; a conclusion that is reasonable, 
considering that interest is deductible from taxable income whereas dividends are not. It has 
to be noted though that the statistical significance of this association varies and seems to be 
sensitive to the empirical specification used. For the capital intensity measure (CAPINT), the 
results indicate that it also has a significant negative association with ETR (p < 0.01). This 
finding is consistent with H3 hypothesis, proving that there exists a preferential tax treatment 
for firms that invest in their fixed assets in Greece. We believe that Income Tax Code’s 
provisions for assets’ depreciation and the tax exemptions provided by investment laws have 
a key role in this association. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the magnitude of the 
CAPINT’s coefficient is of considerable size comparing to the coefficients of the other main 
independent variables. Regarding the inventory intensity (INVINT), there appears to be a 
significant negative association between INVINT and ETR (p < 0.01), a finding that 
contradicts H4 hypothesis and consequently Gupta’s and Newberry’s (1997) hypothesis. This 
negative association is observed despite the fact that the underlying assumption of Gupta’s 
and Newberry’s hypothesis, that inventory intensity ratio is a substitute for the capital 
intensity ratio, does also apply to our sample (see Table 3). It needs to be mentioned though 
that there are also other factors that may have an impact on the relationship between ETR and 
INVINT, which were not taken into account in previous research as, for example, inventory’s 
relationship with sales. Specifically, it is reasonable to expect that if inventory grows faster 
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than sales, a price reduction will follow leading to lower sales revenue and income and 
consequently to lower tax. This relationship has been confirmed empirically in the past when 
Bernard and Noel (1991) found that increases in inventory translate into lower prices and 
lower net income. Examining this relationship in our dataset, we notice that inventory growth 
is about two times greater on average than sales growth (see Table A4 in the Appendix), a 
finding that could probably explain the negative association between ETR and INVINT. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that an increase in INVINT will automatically lead to 
increased storage costs, reducing therefore the firm’s taxable income and its income tax. Last 
but not least, it can be stated that an increase in INVINT is a sign of inefficient use of firm’s 
resources. In this context, firms seem not to be able to allocate their resources in more 
profitable investments, a fact that will probably lead to lower profits and lower income tax. 
The facts mentioned above should be taken into consideration, among others, when 
examining inventory’s association with ETRs. Finally, as regards the firm’s profitability 
(ROA) which is included in our model as a control variable, it is significantly and positively 
associated with ETR, as expected, with varying, though, statistical significance.  
It is important to highlight the fact that the coefficients of three independent variables 
(SIZE, CAPINT, INVINT) maintain their sign and statistical significance at the 1% level for 
all three ETR measures (see Table 4) whereas LEVERAGE and ROA retain their sign with 
varying statistical significance. This observation is important in assessing the robustness of 
our regression results.  
Considering the categorical variables examined (SECTOR, REGION, LEGALFORM, 
EXPORTS), there also appears to exist some significant associations.  First, sector seems to 
have a significant impact on ETRs in agreement with hypothesis H5 as most sectors appear to 
significantly differ from the reference sector (agriculture, forestry and fishing) at the 1% 
level. Specifically, firms in Human Health and Social Work Activities sector as well as firms 
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in the Education sector face in general significantly higher effective tax rates than firms in 
other sectors. On the contrary, firms in the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector face the 
lowest ETRs in the Greek economy. As regards the location in which the firm operates, it 
appears that it is also significantly associated with the firm’s ETR. In particular, firms that 
operate in Sterea Ellada (the region in which Athens, the capital city of Greece, is located in) 
and the Peloponnese face higher ETRs than firms in other geographical areas. On the 
contrary, firms that operate in Thrace and the Islands (Crete, Aegean Islands) face the lowest 
ETRs. This variation is not surprising since, as described in hypothesis H6, there are different 
law provisions and indications of favorable administrative treatment for firms that operate in 
specific areas of Greece (for a detailed presentation of sector and location variables, see 
Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix).  
The firm’s legal form also seems to have a significant impact on ETR in line with 
hypothesis H7. More specifically, limited liability companies (EPE) appear to face higher 
ETRs than public limited liability companies (AE). Considering that the tax law framework 
was almost the same for these two types of firms in the reference period, this difference could 
be attributed to the fact that the directors of the public limited liability companies are 
accountable to the shareholders to a greater extent than the directors of limited liability 
companies who are usually simultaneously the sole shareholders of the company. In this 
context, public limited liability companies are expected to engage more aggressively in tax 
planning activities in an effort to reduce the firm’s tax burden and maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth.  
Finally, the association between ETRs and whether the firm exports or not is, in 
general, insignificant, preventing us from confirming hypothesis H8. 
The examination of the crisis variables can also lead to some interesting conclusions. 
At first, in Equation (1), the CRISIS variable has a negative and significant coefficient at the 
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1% level for all three ETR measures. This result denotes that firms’ ETRs decreased in the 
post – crisis period (2008 – 2014), comparing with the pre – crisis period (2000 – 2007), 
showing that, in accordance with hypothesis H9, the financial crisis period affected 
significantly firms’ ETRs.  
To analyze further the crisis’ period impact on ETRs, we included in equation (2) the 
CRISIS dummy variable as well as four interaction terms. These interaction terms that have 
been formed by multiplying the CRISIS dummy variable by each of the main independent 
variables (SIZE, LEVERAGE, CAPINT, INVINT) allow us to examine whether the association 
between these variables and ETRs changed after the beginning of the financial crisis.  Firstly, 
it is worth noting that the coefficients of the main independent variables (SIZE, LEVERAGE, 
CAPINT, INVINT) keep their sign and statistical significance, despite the inclusion of the 
interaction terms in the specification. More specifically, SIZE, CAPINT and INVINT 
coefficients maintain their sign and statistical significance at the 1% level while the negative 
association between ETR and LEVERAGE holds true with increased statistical significance. 
On the other hand, the CRISIS dummy variable becomes less significant while three of the 
four interaction terms (specifically, CRISIS*SIZE, CRISIS*CAPINT and CRISIS*INVINT) are 
significant at the 1% level for all three ETR measures. In particular, CRISIS*SIZE is negative 
and significant (p < 0.01), implying that larger firms experienced a decrease in ETRs in the 
sub-period after the beginning of the financial crisis. This result can be attributed to the fact 
that these firms may have decided to engage more aggressively in tax planning in their effort 
to ensure that they will not pay more than the tax law requires in the financial crisis period. 
Moreover, CRISIS*INVINT is also negative and significant (p < 0.01) suggesting that 
inventory intensive firms face lower ETRs in the sub-period after the beginning of the 
financial crisis. On the other hand, CRISIS*CAPINT is positive and significant (p < 0.01) 
which means that firms with higher degrees of investment in fixed assets encountered higher 
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ETRs in the 2008 – 2014 period. Inventory – intensive firms seem to be better able to adapt in 
the sub-period after the beginning of the financial crisis in comparison with capital intensive 
firms. This may be due to the fact that capital intensive firms are investing in the long-term 
and cannot easily alter their activities to reduce their taxable income and their income tax. 
Finally, CRISIS*LEVERAGE is positive implying that firms with higher financial leverage 
faced an increase in ETRs in the sub-period after the beginning of the financial crisis. It has to 
be noted, though, that this association is significant only at the 10% level. 
To assess the possible bias that we would have experienced without using a Hausman 
– Taylor random effects model, we also estimate a pooled OLS regression for all three ETR 
measures, for both specifications (1) and (2), an estimation method that was widely used in 
the previous literature. This estimation, though, ignores the potential endogeneity problems 
described in the previous subsection resulting therefore in different results in various ways. 
At first, there are variables with the opposite coefficient sign such as the crisis interaction 
terms CRISIS*SIZE, CRISIS*CAPINT, CRISIS*INVINT. Moreover, the pooled regression 
results include variables with higher statistical significance (e.g. LEVERAGE, EXPORTS) as 
well as variables with lower statistical significance (e.g. CRISIS*SIZE, CRISIS*LEVERAGE). 
Finally, the coefficients’ magnitude differs considerably from the Hausman-Taylor estimates 
as there are variables with coefficients almost four times larger in absolute terms. All the 
above lead to the conclusion that a simple pooled OLS regression may have led to biased 
results, given the endogeneity problems ignored in such estimation. Due to space limitations, 
detailed results of this analysis are available upon request. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examined the determinants of the variability in corporate effective 
tax rates (ETRs) before and after the beginning of the financial crisis (2000 – 2014) in Greece 
using elements of firms’ financial statements. 
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We find that the corporate ETRs in Greece vary with several firm-specific 
characteristics such as the firm’s size, its financial leverage, its capital and inventory 
intensity. More specifically, we find that larger firms in Greece face higher ETRs than smaller 
ones, a result that implies that these firms are not capable of exploiting their power to reduce 
their tax burden, at least not to a considerable degree. The results also indicate a negative 
association between financial leverage and ETR, in accordance with the hypothesis that the 
tax regime is favorable for firms that prefer debt to equity financing. It should be noted 
though that the statistical significance of this association varies and seems to be sensitive to 
the empirical specification used. Moreover, the firm’s capital intensity is negatively 
associated with ETR, confirming the hypothesis that the tax framework is favorable for firms 
that invest in fixed assets. A negative and significant association also exists between 
inventory intensity and ETR, a finding that denotes that firms that invest in their inventory 
face, ceteris paribus, lower ETRs. Moreover, there appears to exist significant associations 
between ETR and the sector in which the firm operates, its location and its legal form. With 
regard to the effect of the financial crisis period on ETRs, we observed at first that the firms’ 
ETRs decreased in the sub-period after the beginning of the financial crisis (2008 – 2014). 
Analyzing further this effect, we concluded that larger firms, as well as inventory intensive 
firms, experienced a decrease in ETRs in the sub-period after the beginning of the financial 
crisis. On the contrary, firms with higher degrees of investment in fixed assets encountered, 
in the same period, higher ETRs. 
The above findings point to the conclusion that the corporate income tax burden in 
Greece is unequally distributed across different types of firms as we find strong evidence that 
specific firm characteristics such as the firm’s size, its financial leverage and its capital and 
inventory intensity, influence the level of the corporate effective tax rates. Policymakers can 
build on this analysis whether their goal is to secure tax revenue or to remove distortions that 
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undermine the neutrality of the tax system and adversely affect the creation of a more 
investment-friendly environment. At first, emphasis should be put on firms that face lower 
ETRs on a regular basis; a broadening of the tax base is of crucial importance especially 
during the recession period that Greece is currently going through. Moreover, firms that face 
regularly higher ETRs should be as well brought into focus as the presence of disincentives to 
investment in specific activities must be made explicit to policymakers. Given the conclusion 
reached that the corporate income tax in Greece is not levied neutrally, it needs to be 
investigated whether this “departure” from neutrality is desirable (for example to promote 
specific activities) or if it occurred over time and needs to be corrected. The preceding 
analysis could also be useful from the firms’ point of view, as the factors that determine the 
corporate ETRs such as the sector and location in which a firm operates should be taken into 
consideration by firms investing or planning to invest in Greece. Finally, our research 
methodology could be also applied to other European countries that are experiencing similar 
challenges regarding the effectiveness of their tax systems during the current financial crisis 
such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 
Several issues can be incorporated in future research. Firstly, this study could be 
extended to general and limited partnerships that make up the majority of firms operating in 
Greece. Given that these data are not publicly available as these firms are not obliged to 
publish their financial statements, that kind of research requires data extraction from various 
administrative sources (e.g. Ministry of Finance, General Secretariat for Public Revenue). 
Furthermore, apart from the independent and control variables that we incorporated in our 
study, there may also exist other factors that have an impact on corporate ETRs. For example, 
the effect of the firm’s ownership structure (e.g. whether it is a domestic or a foreign-owned 
firm), its international operations, its involvement in research and development or its auditor 
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and tax advice expenses were not examined in this study due to data constraints. Future 
research could address these issues. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
Two - 
sample t-
value test 
Two - sample 
Wilcoxon - 
Mann -
Whitney test 
ETR1 0.152 0.166 0.096 0 1 30.191*** 28.682*** 
ETR2 0.144 0.161 0.067 0 1 32.237*** 29.894*** 
ETR3 0.088 0.11 0.009 0 1 29.408*** 27.492*** 
SIZE 14.28 1.41 14.22 7.396 20.718 -40.062*** -38.626*** 
LEVERAGE 0.066 0.234 0 0 46.551 -11.831*** -11.650*** 
CAPINT 0.41 0.315 0.347 0 1 -2.250** -0.552 
INVINT 0.131 0.177 0.427 0 0.999 3.272*** 8.137*** 
ROA 0.025 0.47 0.009 -93.257 7.453 4.785*** 20.056*** 
Notes: ETR1 is defined as the ratio of tax payable to net income before taxes. ETR2, is defined as the ratio of tax 
payable to operating result.ETR3, is defined as the ratio of tax payable to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA). SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is measured as 
the ratio of medium – long –term liabilities to total assets. CAPINT is measured as the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
assets. INVINT is measured as the ratio of end-year’s inventory to total assets. ROA is measured as the ratio of net 
income before taxes to total assets. 
The two – sample tests were conducted as a hypothesis test for the difference between the means of the dependent 
and independent variables before and after the beginning of the financial crisis (periods 2000 – 2007 and 2008 – 
2014, respectively). The tests were conducted after the calculation of the dependent and independent variables’ 
means for each firm for the two periods under consideration. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
Table 1 
Sample Construction 
All firms in ICAP Databank 53,235 
- Firms with missing data and/or no continuous activity in 
the reference period 
43,362 
- Financial Firms, Insurance Companies 228 
- Firms  
o with negative ETRs 
o with negative tax (tax refund) and negative 
income (loss) 
o with ETRs>1 
4,709 
Final sample (number of firms) 4,936 
Final sample (number of observations) 74,040 
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Table 3 
Pairwise Correlations among variables 
 
ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 SIZE LEVERAGE CAPINT INVINT ROA 
ETR1   1.000        
ETR2 0.910***   1.000       
ETR3 0.780*** 0.822***   1.000      
SIZE 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.065***   1.000 
    
LEVERAGE -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.125*** 0.136***      1.000 
   
CAPINT -0.344*** -0.337*** -0.360*** -0.045*** 0.135***  1.000 
  
INVINT 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.065*** 0.152*** -0.045*** -0.463*** 1.000 
 
ROA 0.133*** 0.138*** 0.230*** 0.041*** -0.035*** -0.062*** 0.001 1.000 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 
Hausman – Taylor Estimates of effective tax rates on various firm characteristics over the period 2000 - 2014 (n = 4,936) 
 Predicted  
Sign 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 
Intercept +/- 
-0.279*** 
(-10.08) 
-0.273*** 
(-10.43) 
-0.191*** 
(-7.78) 
-0.279*** 
(-9.55) 
-0.290*** 
(-10.50) 
-0.179*** 
(-7.02) 
SIZE + 
0.028*** 
(17.58) 
0.027*** 
(17.95) 
0.020*** 
(12.27) 
0.028*** 
(16.12) 
0.029*** 
(17.31) 
0.019*** 
(11.36) 
LEVERAGE - 
-0.017* 
(-1.34) 
-0.017* 
(-1.33) 
-0.008 
(-1.19) 
-0.042** 
(-1.92) 
-0.040** 
(-1.90) 
-0.023* 
(-1.62) 
CAPINT - 
-0.140*** 
(-27.23) 
-0.142*** 
(-28.20) 
-0.127*** 
(-29.26) 
-0.156*** 
(-26.91) 
-0.163*** 
(-28.96) 
-0.148*** 
(-29.94) 
INVINT + 
-0.067*** 
(-7.83) 
-0.070*** 
(-8.54) 
-0.093*** 
(-14.97) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.039*** 
(-4.29) 
-0.072*** 
(-9.83) 
ROA + 
0.011**  
(1.76) 
0.011** 
(1.75) 
0.020* 
(1.40) 
0.010** 
(1.76) 
0.011*** 
(1.75) 
0.020* 
(1.40) 
CRISIS +/- 
-0.055*** 
(52.33) 
-0.057*** 
(-54.77) 
-0.034*** 
(-36.56) 
-0.021** 
(-1.72) 
0.004 
(0.34) 
-0.020** 
(-2.29) 
Sector 15 (Human, Health & 
Social Work Activities) 
+/- 
0.133*** 
(7.59) 
0.132*** 
(8.08) 
0.095*** 
(7.48) 
0.136*** 
(7.77) 
0.136*** 
(8.27) 
0.098*** 
(7.69) 
Sector 18 (Education) +/- 
0.111*** 
(5.28) 
0.100*** 
(5.23) 
0.054*** 
(4.08) 
0.113*** 
(5.41) 
0.102*** 
(5.36) 
0.056*** 
(4.22) 
Sector 11 (Real Estate 
Activities) 
+/- 
0.103*** 
(6.98) 
0.107*** 
(7.88) 
0.099*** 
(9.73) 
0.103*** 
(7.03) 
0.107*** 
(7.90) 
0.100*** 
(9.78) 
Sector 6 (Wholesale & 
Retail Trade) 
+/- 
0.090*** 
(7.01) 
0.088*** 
(7.55) 
0.054*** 
(7.05) 
0.092*** 
(6.91) 
0.090*** 
(7.67) 
0.056*** 
(7.23) 
Region 4  
(Sterea Ellada) 
+/- 
0.066*** 
(5.93) 
0.061*** 
(5.68) 
0.037*** 
(4.67) 
0.068*** 
(6.15) 
0.063*** 
(5.90) 
0.039*** 
(4.93) 
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Region 5  
(Peloponnese) 
+/- 
0.063*** 
(4.96) 
0.058*** 
(4.67) 
0.031*** 
(3.48) 
0.065*** 
(5.10) 
0.059*** 
(4.82) 
0.033*** 
(3.64) 
LEGAL FORM +/- 
0.033*** 
(5.87) 
0.031*** 
(5.62) 
0.038*** 
(7.06) 
0.032*** 
(5.69) 
0.030*** 
(5.48) 
0.037*** 
(6.90) 
EXPORTS - 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.003 
(-0.81) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.89) 
0.002 
(0.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.007** 
(-2.22) 
CRISIS * SIZE -    
-0.003*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.005*** 
(-6.45) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.33) 
CRISIS * LEVERAGE +/-    
0.032* 
(1.44) 
0.030* 
(1.41) 
0.019* 
(1.35) 
CRISIS * CAPINT +    
0.040*** 
(9.61) 
0.052*** 
(12.70) 
0.041*** 
(13.70) 
CRISIS * INVINT -    
-0.059*** 
(-8.72) 
-0.049*** 
(-7.40) 
-0.028*** 
(-5.57) 
Sargan – Hansen test  
[p-value] 
 
0.435 
[0.510] 
1.599 
[0.206] 
0.667 
[0.414] 
0.614 
[0.435] 
2.063 
[0.151] 
0.645  
[0.422] 
R
2
  0.095 0.101 0.122 0.103 0.111 0.135 
No. of firms  4,928 4,928 4,927 4,928 4,928 4,927 
No. of observations  62,800 62,796 53,176 62,800 62,796 53,176 
Notes: Dependent variables: ETR1, ETR2, ETR3. ETR1 is defined as the ratio of tax payable to net income before taxes; ETR2, is defined as the ratio of tax payable to operating result; ETR3, is 
defined as the ratio of tax payable to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). ETRs cannot be defined when the denominator (net income before taxes, operating 
result or EBITDA) is equal to zero. Independent and control variables: SIZE, CAPINT, INVINT, CAPINT, ROA. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; LEVERAGE is 
measured as the ratio of medium – long –term liabilities to total assets; CAPINT is measured as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets; INVINT is measured as the ratio of end-year’s 
inventory to total assets; ROA is measured as the ratio of net income before taxes to total assets. Categorical variables: SECTOR, REGION, LEGALFORM, EXPORTS, CRISIS. The sectors and 
regions presented in this table are the ones with the highest coefficient. For a detailed sector – location analysis, see tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix.  
LEVERAGE, SIZE, CAPINT, INVINT, ROA and the interaction terms are treated as endogenous variables. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parentheses (robust standard errors were used so as to correct for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within panels). Coefficients are rounded to the third decimal place. 
Variables used as instruments: SECTOR, REGION,  LEGALFORM, EXPORTS, CRISIS 
The validity of our instruments is tested by Sargan-Hansen test. The null hypothesis indicates that the over-identified restrictions are valid (a p-value greater than 0.01 signifies that the null is 
not rejected at 1% level of significance). 
 
 
39 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1 
Variables 
ETR1 Current Worldwide Income Tax / Net Income Before Taxes 
ETR2 Current Worldwide Income Tax / Operating Result 
ETR3 Current Worldwide Income Tax / EBITDA 
SIZE LN (Assets) 
LEVERAGE Medium – Long term liabilities / Total Assets 
CAPINT Net Fixed Assets / Total Assets 
INVINT Inventory / Total Assets 
ROA Net Income Before Taxes / Total Assets 
SECTOR See Table A2 
REGION See Table A3 
CRISIS 1, if year = 2008 – 2014, 0 if year = 2000 - 2007 
CRISIS * SIZE Interaction Term 
CRISIS * LEVERAGE Interaction Term 
CRISIS * CAPINT Interaction Term 
CRISIS * INVINT Interaction Term 
LEGALFORM 1 for Limited Liability Companies (EPE), 0 for Public Limited Liability 
Companies (AE)=0 
EXPORTS 1, if the firm is exporting, 0 otherwise 
 
Table A2 
Sectors 
Sector 1   Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
Sector 2   Mining and Quarrying 
Sector 3   Manufacturing 
Sector 4   Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
Sector 5   Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
Sector 6   Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Sector 7   Transportation and Storage 
Sector 8   Accommodation and food service activities 
Sector 9   Information and Communication 
Sector 10   Financial and Insurance Activities 
Sector 11   Real Estate Activities 
Sector 12   Professional, scientific and technical activities 
Sector 13   Administrative and support service activities 
Sector 14   Public administration and Defence; compulsory social security 
Sector 15   Human health and social work activities 
Sector 16   Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 
Sector 17   Other Service Activities 
Sector 18   Education 
Sector 20   Construction 
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Table A3 
Regions 
Region 1  Thrace 
Region 2  Macedonia 
Region 3  Epirus 
Region 4  Sterea Ellada 
Region 5  Peloponnese 
Region 6  Aegean Islands 
Region 7  Ionian Islands 
Region 8  Crete 
Region 9  Thessaly 
 
Table A4 
Statistics for Firms’ Sales Growth & Inventory Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sales Growth 63,351 0.395 31.479 -1 7,149 
Inventory Growth 48,885 0.882 42.774 -1 6,028 
Notes: Sales Growth is calculated as the annual percentage change of firm’s turnover. Inventory Growth is calculated as the 
annual percentage change of firm’s end-of-year’s inventory 
 
Table A5 
Hausman – Taylor Estimates of effective tax rates on various sectors over the period 2000 - 
2014 (n = 4,936) 
  Equation (1) Equation (2) 
 Sector ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 
2 
0.037 * 
(1.52) 
0.054**  
(1.88) 
0.021*  
(1.29) 
0.039*  
(1.62) 
0.057** 
(1.97) 
0.023* 
(1.41) 
3 
0.068***  
(5.28) 
0.071***  
(6.01) 
0.035*** 
(4.46) 
0.07*** 
(5.42) 
0.073***  
(6.14) 
0.036*** 
(4.63) 
4 
0.063**  
(2.26) 
0.087***  
(2.73) 
0.052*** 
(2.62) 
0.065*** 
(2.38) 
0.089***  
(2.84) 
0.054***  
(2.80) 
5 
0.081**  
(2.32) 
0.094** 
(2.05) 
0.074***  
(2.51) 
0.085***  
(2.44) 
0.099**  
(2.15) 
0.078***  
(2.64) 
6 
0.09 *** 
(7.01) 
0.088***  
(7.55) 
0.054***  
(7.05) 
0.092***  
(7.14) 
0.09***  
(7.67) 
0.056***  
(7.23) 
7 
0.057***  
(3.90) 
0.063***  
(4.44) 
0.047*** 
(4.59) 
0.06*** 
(4.09) 
0.066*** 
(4.63) 
0.05*** 
(4.80) 
8 
0.051***  
(3.92) 
0.057***  
(4.83) 
0.043*** 
(5.49) 
0.052***  
(4.00) 
0.058***  
(4.89) 
0.044***  
(5.55) 
9 
0.061***  
(4.01) 
0.062***  
(4.39) 
0.033***  
(3.33) 
0.063***  
(4.10) 
0.063***  
(4.48) 
0.034*** 
(3.41) 
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11 
0.103*** 
(6.98) 
0.107*** 
(7.88) 
0.099***  
(9.73) 
0.103***  
(7.03) 
0.107***  
(7.90) 
0.100***  
(9.78) 
12 
0.074*** 
(5.07) 
0.076***  
(5.65) 
0.057***  
(5.75) 
0.077***  
(5.25) 
0.079*** 
(5.84) 
0.059***  
(5.93) 
13 
0.036***  
(2.56) 
0.037***  
(2.84) 
0.03***  
(3.23) 
0.038***  
(2.68) 
0.039***  
(2.97) 
0.031***  
(3.37) 
14 
0.067**  
(2.00) 
0.069** 
(2.14) 
0.061** 
(2.21) 
0.071**  
(2.11) 
0.073** 
(2.24) 
0.065** 
(2.34) 
15 
0.133***  
19.59) 
0.132***  
(8.08) 
0.095***  
(7.48) 
0.136***  
(7.77) 
0.136***  
(8.27) 
0.098***  
(7.69) 
16 
-0.023  
(-0.99) 
-0.017  
(-0.85) 
-0.009  
(-0.78) 
-0.02  
(-0.87) 
-0.014  
(-0.72) 
-0.007  
(-0.59) 
17 
0.049*  
(1.51) 
0.054* 
(1.58) 
0.026  
(1.21) 
0.049*  
(1.48) 
0.055*  
(1.56) 
0.026  
(1.17) 
18 
0.111***  
(5.28) 
0.100*** 
(5.23) 
0.054***  
(4.08) 
0.113***  
(5.41) 
0.102***  
(5.36) 
0.056***  
(4.22) 
20 
0.057***  
(4.00) 
0.059***  
(4.51) 
0.049***  
(5.17) 
0.06***  
(4.16) 
0.062***  
(4.68) 
0.051***  
(5.35) 
Notes: Dependent variables: ETR1, ETR2, ETR3. ETR1 is defined as the ratio of tax payable to net income before taxes; ETR2, 
is defined as the ratio of tax payable to operating result; ETR3, is defined as the ratio of tax payable to earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Sector 1 is the reference sector. For sectors’ definition, see Table 
A2.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parentheses (robust 
standard errors were used so as to correct for the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within panels). 
 
Table A6 
Hausman – Taylor Estimates of effective tax rates on various regions over the period 2000 - 
2014 (n = 4,936) 
  Equation (1) Equation (2) 
 Region ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 ETR1 ETR2 ETR3 
2 0.053***  
(4.61) 
0.046***  
(4.16) 
0.021***  
(2.62) 
0.055***  
(4.80) 
0.048***  
(4.36) 
0.023***  
(2.83) 
3 0.061***  
(3.69) 
0.06*** 
(3.84) 
0.029***  
(2.54) 
0.063***  
(3.81) 
0.062***  
(3.97) 
0.03***  
(2.66) 
4 0.066***  
(5.93) 
0.061***  
(5.68) 
0.037***  
(4.67) 
0.068***  
(6.15) 
0.063***  
(5.90) 
0.039***  
(4.93) 
5 0.063***  
(4.96) 
0.058*** 
(4.67) 
0.031***  
(3.48) 
0.065***  
(5.10) 
0.059***  
(4.82) 
0.033***  
(3.64) 
6 0.044***  
(3.67) 
0.036***  
(3.12) 
0.017**  
(2.05) 
0.046***  
(3.87) 
0.038***  
(3.34) 
0.019**  
(2.27) 
7 0.035***  
(2.72) 
0.026** 
(2.13) 
0.013*  
(1.41) 
0.037***  
(2.89) 
0.028***  
(2.33) 
0.014* 
(1.59) 
8 0.03***  
(2.52) 
0.024**  
(2.11) 
0.009  
(1.12) 
0.032***  
(2.69) 
0.026**  
(2.29) 
0.011*  
(1.30) 
9 0.041***  
(3.10) 
0.036***  
(2.84) 
0.011  
(1.18) 
0.043***  
(3.24) 
0.038***  
(3.00) 
0.012*  
(1.36) 
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Notes: Dependent variables: ETR1, ETR2, ETR3. ETR1 is defined as the ratio of tax payable to net income before taxes; ETR2, 
is defined as the ratio of tax payable to operating result; ETR3, is defined as the ratio of tax payable to earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Region 1 is the reference region. For regions’ definition, see Table 
A3.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parentheses (robust 
standard errors were used so as to correct for the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within panels). 
 
